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Abstract: We tackle the polling problem in social networks where the privacy of exchanged
information and user reputation are very critical. Indeed, users want to preserve the confidentiality
of their votes and to hide, if any, their misbehaviors. Recent works [9, 10] proposed polling protocols
based on simple secret sharing scheme and without requiring any central authority or cryptography
system. But these protocols can be deployed safely provided that the social graph structure should
be transformed into a ring-based structure and the number of participating users is perfect square.
Accordingly, devising polling protocols regardless these constraints remains a challenging issue.
In this work, we propose a simple decentralized polling protocol that relies on the current state
of social graphs. More explicitly, we define one family of social graphs and show their struc-
tures constitute necessary and sufficient condition to ensure vote privacy and limit the impact
of dishonest users on the accuracy of the output of the poll. In a system of N users with
D ≤ N/5 dishonest ones (and similarly to the works [9, 10] where they considered D < √N),
a privacy parameter k enables us to obtain the following results: (i) the probability to recover
one vote of honest node is bounded by
∑2k
m=k+1
(
D
N
)m
.
(
1
2
)2k+1−m; (ii) the maximum number
of votes revealed by dishonest nodes is 2D; and, (iii) the maximum impact on the output is
(6k+ 4)D. Despite the use of richer social graph structures, we succeed to detect the misbehaving
users by manipulating verification procedures based on shortest path scheme and routing tables.
An experimental evaluation demonstrates that the dishonest coalition never affects the outcome
of the poll outside the theoretical bound of (6k + 4)D.
Key-words: Social networks, Polling protocol, Secret sharing, Privacy.
∗ Lorraine University & INRIA Nancy – Grand-Est (Bao-Thien.Hoang@inria.fr)
† Lorraine University & INRIA Nancy – Grand-Est (Abdessamad.Imine@inria.fr).
Problème du Sondage dans les Réseaux Sociaux
Résumé : Nous abordons le problème de sondage dans les réseaux sociaux où le caractère
secret des informations échangées et la réputation de l’utilisateur sont très critiques. En effet,
les utilisateurs désirent préserver la confidentialité de leur vote et dissimuler, le cas échéant,
leurs mauvais comportements. Des travaux récents [9, 10] ont proposé des protocoles de sondage
basés sur la partage de secret et nécessitant aucune infrastructure cryptographique. Néanmoins,
ces protocoles ne sont applicables que si le graphe social a une structure d’anneau et le nom-
bre d’utilisateurs est un carré parfait. En conséquence, l’élaboration de protocoles de sondage
indépendamment de ces contraintes reste un problème ouvert.
Dans ce rapport, nous proposons un protocole décentralisé de sondage qui s’appuie sur l’état
réel des graphes sociaux. Plus précisément, nous définissons une famille de graphes et montrons
que leurs structures constituent la condition nécessaire et suffisante pour assurer la confidentialité
du vote et limiter l’impact des utilisateurs malhonnêtes sur la précision de la sortie du scrutin.
Dans un système de N utilisateurs, tel que D ≤ N/5 sont malhonnêtes (et similairement aux
travaux [9, 10] qui se limitaient à D <
√
N)), un paramètre de confidentialité k nous permet
d’obtenir les résultats suivants : (i) la probabilité de récupérer la voix d’un noeud honnête est
bornée par
∑2k
m=k+1
(
D
N
)m
.
(
1
2
)2k+1−m ; (ii) le nombre maximum de votes révélés par des nœuds
malhonnêtes est de 2D ; et, (iii) l’impact maximum sur la sortie est (6k+4)D. Malgré l’utilisation
de riches structures de graphes sociaux, nous sommes parvenus à détecter les comportements des
utilisateurs malhonnêtes en manipulant des procédures de vérification s’appuyant sur le calcul du
plus court chemin et des tables de routage. Une évaluation expérimentale montre que l’influence
de la coalition d’utilisateurs malhonnêtes sur le résultat du scrutin ne dépassera pas la borne
théorique de (6k + 4)D.
Mots-clés : Réseaux sociaux, Protocole de sondage, Partage de secret, Vie privée
On the Polling Problem for Social Networks 3
Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 Polling and Social Network Models 5
2.1 Polling Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Social Network as a Graph Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Protocol 8
3.1 Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Properties of protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 Protocol and graph without dishonest nodes 12
5 Protocol and graph with dishonest nodes 14
6 Experimental evaluation 21
7 Related work 22
8 Conclusion 27
RR n° 8055
4 H. Bao-Thien and A. Imine
1 Introduction
We have seen the power of social media and its effect on society in the last few years. Online
social network (OSN) has been the most useful and typical technology of that. The user number
of such networks is blowing up exponentially. Just to demonstrate one typical example, as of
now Facebook has more than 901 million active users and 526 million daily active users on
average.1 OSN allows participant to do anything for a variety of purposes concerning business,
entertainment, world’s events and culture such as getting friendship, publishing and sharing
information, exchanging documents, expressing opinions in politics.
In this work, we approach to one of the current practical, useful but sensitive topic in Online
Social Networks (OSN), the polling process. In general, polling is the way to determine the most
favorite choice amongst some options from the participants. Each participant can distribute
his preference by submitting vote, and after aggregating all votes, the majority option will be
chosen as the final result. For instance, one company of mobile phone has just launched a new
product and may want to ask customers whether or not its features are comfortable, and user
will choose one option between “Yes” or “No”. We here consider simply a binary polling with
only two options “+1” or “-1” for the concerning question.
The main objective in such a polling protocol is performing a secure and accurate process
to sum up the initial votes with the presence of dishonest users, who try to bias the final result
and reveal the votes of honest ones. The polling problem is simple but it takes an important
role in incorporating user’s opinion online. Thus, currently, there are some studies and solutions
for this problem in two approaches, centralized and distributed networks. In the centralized
OSN, a central server is used to collect the users’ votes and sum up all values to obtain output.
Facebook Pool2 and Doodle3 are well illustrative examples. However, this approach suffers from
server failures and particularly privacy problems: it is not guaranteed the central server will not
bias and disclose the user votes.
In our work, we are interested in polling protocol based on decentralized OSN, where privacy
of user is improved as information is not concentrated in one place. Recently, Guerraoui et al.
[9, 10] proposed, DPol, a simple decentralized polling protocol based on secret sharing scheme
(without using cryptography) where both honest and dishonest participants are considered. In
DPol, participants care about their reputation. Indeed, they do not want their votes to be
disclosed nor their misbehaviors, if any, to be publicly exposed. To dissuade user misbehaviors,
distributed verification procedures are manipulated to detect with a non-zero probability these
misbehaviors and enable honest users to tag profile of dishonest ones. Moreover, DPol ensures
privacy of votes and final result accuracy by limiting the impact of dishonest users. However,
DPol has practically some disadvantages. Firstly, DPol relies on a structured overlay, cluster-
ring-based structure, which is on top and really apart from the normal social graph. It does not
take into account the social links among users in the sense that it builds the uniform distribution
of users into groups. This is not practical as we have to target a special case using notion of group
instead of reserving the normal structure of the graph. This construction would be necessarily
based on centralized solution. Hence we lose the benefit of a fully decentralized polling protocol.
Second, the number of users should be a perfect square number such that one graph with N
users are divided into
√
N groups of size
√
N . It should be noted designing decentralized polling
protocol without cryptography and constraints (overlay structure and perfect square number of
users) imposed in [9, 10] remains a challenge problem.
Contributions. Our objective is to keep the natural property of the graph in the sense user and
1http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22
2http://apps.facebook.com/opinionpolls/
3http://www.doodle.com/
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social links should be preserved, and each individual can perform the voting process privately
and securely without resorting to the group division.
Inspired from [9, 10], first, we propose a design of a simple decentralized polling protocol
that uses social graphs. Second, we describe properties required for the social graph to ensure
the correctness of the protocol. Furthermore, we cover a general case for the graph topology on
which the protocol can run properly. Despite the use of richer social graph structures, one node
can receive/send so many duplicated messages from/to other nodes. This can lead to flooding
the local storage. By thoroughly using the graph structure, our protocol enables one node to
deal with only necessary messages. Instead of accepting all messages, a node stores only the
ones passed by the optimal paths. To prevent user misbehaviours, we introduce verification
procedures based on shortest path scheme and routing tables. Using the same notion of privacy
parameter k in [9, 10], we get the following results in a system of size N with D dishonest users:
one vote of honest node is recovered with the probability at most
∑2k
m=k+1
(
D
N
)m
.
(
1
2
)2k+1−m; and
up to 2D votes can be revealed by the dishonest coalition, and the impact from the dishonest
coalition to the final result is at most (6k + 4)D. We validate our solution with a performance
evaluation which shows that our protocol is accurate and close to the theoretical average impact,
that is 4k + 2α + 2, where α is the proportion of users correctly voting. Our result encourages
the use of polling protocol without transforming the social graphs into other overlay structures.
Outline. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our polling model, and in-
troduces a family of social graphs. Section 3 presents our polling protocol with its correctness
properties. We establish formally the relation between the protocol and the family of social
graphs, and analyse different complexities to perform the polling in two cases, presence or not
presence of dishonest nodes, in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. Section 6 illustrates our
experimental results. We review related work in Section 7 and conclude the paper with future
research in Section 8.
2 Polling and Social Network Models
This section introduces what are ingredients of polling models and presents the graph models
to describe social networks. It should be noted that we consider the same assumptions like the
work [9, 10].
2.1 Polling Model
The polling problem consists of a system with N uniquely identified nodes representing users
of a social network. Each participant un (or simply, n) expresses its opinion by giving a vote
vn ∈ {−1, 1}. After collecting the votes of all nodes, the expected outcome is
∑
n vn. In this
work, we consider the following assumptions:
Each node is able to communicate with its neighbors (e.g., direct friends), and is either honest
or dishonest. The honest node completely complies with the protocol and takes care about its
privacy and reputation in the sense that the vote value is not disclosed. All dishonest nodes can
form a coalition to get the full knowledge of the network and try to do everything to achieve
these goals without being detected: (i) bias the result of the election by promoting their votes or
changing the values they received from other honest nodes; (ii) infer the opinions of other nodes.
However, they also want to protect their reputation from being affected. In order to unify the
opinions and not give compensating effects, all dishonest nodes make the single coalition D of
size D. Nevertheless, they are still selfish in the sense that each dishonest node prefers to take
care about its own reputation to covering up each other.
RR n° 8055
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In order to prevent and reduce the incorrect behaviors, there is an activity affected to profile
of concerned node. In particular, if node u is detected as misbehavior one by v then u’s profile is
tagged with statement “u has been detected bad behavior by v” and in v’s profile has statement
“u is bad guy”. Furthermore, we do not take into account the situation that dishonest nodes
wrongfully blame honest ones, or do Sybil attacks and spam since that kinds of misbehavior can
be detected by some tools or several existing systems such as SybilLGuard[20], SybilLimit [19],
[14, 18] (for filtering wrongful blames), and [14, 17] (for mitigating spam).
2.2 Social Network as a Graph Models
We present the social network in our problem as the form of models of social graph. In this
section, firstly, we define the terms and notations of graph used throughout our work. Later,
we demonstrate the family of graphs including the ideal case (network without dishonest nodes)
and normal case (network with the presence of dishonest nodes).
Notations. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph where V = {u0, u1, ..., uN−1} is a set of
uniquely identified nodes of size N , and E is an edge set. Each node is either honest or dishonest.
We represent H(X) and D(X) as the set of honest nodes and dishonest nodes of size D = |D(X )|
in graph X. For a node un ∈ V , let us identify the following notations: dn as a degree (a
number of neighbors) of un; R(un) (or simply, Rn) as the set of neighbors of un; Fn and Qn
(Fn,Qn ⊆ Rn) are respectively set of neighbors that un sends and receives messages.
Paths and Distances. Given two nodes u, v ∈ V , they can connect directly or not. We denote
by function e(u, v) this kind of relation, namely, e(u, v) = 1 if there is a link between u and v,
otherwise e(u, v) = 0.
A path p of length l ∈ N in the graph is an ordered sequence of l + 1 nodes such that there
exists an edge connecting two consecutive nodes in the sequence: p = 〈uk1 , uk2 , . . . , ukl+1〉 with
uki ∈ V , e(uki , uki+1) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ l. We write l(p) to refer the length of path p, i.e., number of
the edges of p. As e(uki , uki+1) = 1 then l(〈uki , uki+1〉) = 1. If path p contains only one node,
l(p) = 0.
For two nodes u, v ∈ V , let p(u, v) be a path connecting between u and v and Pa(u, v) be
the set of all such paths. We write x ∈ p(u, v) if path p(u, v) contains node x. For two paths
p(u1, v1), p(u2, v2), we define the intersection of them as follows: p(u1, v1)∩ p(u2, v2) = {x ∈ V |
x ∈ p(u1, v1) and x ∈ p(u2, v2)}.
Additionally, each node is either honest or dishonest. Thus, to transmit messages between
two nodes u and v, it is important to consider the honesty property of each node (i.e., checking
whether node is honest or dishonest) in the paths connecting them. Particularly, if u and v
are directly connected, i.e., e(u, v) = 1, we should investigate the honesty property of u and
v. The transmission is secure only if they are all honest and is unsecured in other case. If
e(u, v) = 0, we should examine all paths connecting between u and v. For a path p(u, v) =
〈u ≡ uk1 , uk2 , ..., ukm ≡ v〉 (where e(uki , uki+1) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1), we have to check honest
property of each intermediate node uki . The transmission in that path is secure only if all nodes
are honest and we call it “honest path”. If there exists at least one honest path between u and
v, it guarantees the correct information from u (or v) will approach to v (or u).
We describe, more formally, the way to check the secure transmission between nodes u and v
by using concept “trust level”. Let us firstly define the value q for two directly connected nodes
u, v as q(u, v) = 1 if u, v are honest, and q(u, v) = 0 otherwise. Note that the value of q(u, u)
depends on whether u is honest or not. The “trust level” for a specific path p is:
T (p) =
{
q(u, u) if p = 〈u〉
q(u1, u2).T (〈u2, ..., um〉) if p = 〈u1, u2, ..., um〉
(1)
Inria
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Here, notation “.” is multiplication operation.
Now for all paths Pa(u, v) linking two nodes u and v, the trust level T (u, v) is given as:
T (u, v) =
∑
p∈Pa(u,v)
T (p) (2)
Obviously, T (u, v) = 0 if u or v is dishonest. Therefore, we often use T (u, v) when u, v are honest.
In case that transmission in path p = 〈u1, u2, ..., um〉 is safe, i.e., T (p) > 0, then p is a “honest
path”. For instance, consider the graph given in Figure 1, where we consider dishonest nodes are w
and y and the remaining are honest ones. According to Formula 2: (i) T (w,w) = 0 as q(w,w) = 0,
and (ii) T (s, d) = T (p(〈s, w, d〉))+T (p(〈s, x, d〉))+T (p(〈s, x, y, d〉))+T (p(〈s, x, y, t, d〉)) = 1 since
q(s, w) = 0 and q(x, y) = 0.
For a graph G, there exists, for all pairs of honest nodes u, v, at least one honest path between
them, then G is called “honest graph”. Formally, G is honest if ∀u, v ∈ H(G) : T (u, v) > 0.
w d
ts
x y
Figure 1: Example of social graph
Shortest paths. We illustrate by pS(u, v) and PaS(u, v) the shortest path and the set of all
shortest paths between two nodes u and v. In [8], a simple but fast and accurate algorithm for
the approximation of shortest paths between pair of nodes in the real-world graph is presented.
We can use this method to determine the shortest paths and distances between two nodes. The
length of the shortest path between u and v, is denoted by δ(u, v), i.e., δ(u, v) = l(pS(u, v)).
Graph Model. So far, we presented the polling model in which participants are either honest
or dishonest. Like [9, 10], we use a predefined parameter k ∈ N (this parameter will be detailed
in section 3.1) to present the features of our social graphs. Let G = (V,E) be a social graph
with the following properties:
Property 1 (Pg1). dn ≥ 2k + 1 and |Fn| = |Qn| = 2k + 1, for every un ∈ V .
Property 2 (Pg2). G is a honest graph, i.e., for every honest nodes u, v, there exists a path
p(u, v) containing only intermediate honest nodes.
Property 3 (Pg3). D < N/2.
From these properties, we characterize two families of graphs:
(i) G1 = {G | D(G) = ∅ and G satisfies Pg1}.
(ii) G2 = {G | D(G) 6= ∅ and G satisfies Pg1 , Pg2 and Pg3}.
Graphs in G1 contain no dishonest nodes and in G2 are normal graphs with the existence of
dishonest nodes. According to Property Pg1 , each node has a set of receivers (Fn) and a set
of senders (Qn) to establish communication and they have the same size and may be disjoint.
Property Pg2 ensures each honest node always obtains one correct version of data from other
honest ones. Property Pg3 enables us to limit the control of dishonest users in the whole system.
RR n° 8055
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Algorithm 1: Polling algorithm at node un, n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}
Input:
vn: A vote of node, value in {−1, 1}
dn: degree of node
k : privacy parameter
Rn: set of direct neighbors
Fn: set of neighbors to send shares
Qn: set of neighbors to receive shares
Variables:
cn: collected data, cn = 0
Cn: set of possible collected data
Cn[{0, 1, ..., N − 1} → ∅]
hn: set of final choosing collected data
hn[{0, 1, ..., N − 1} → ⊥]
Γn: routing table
Γn[{0, 1, ..., N − 1} → ∅]
Output: result
Algorithm
1 Share(vn, Fn) | ReceiveShareEvent
2 Broadcast(n, cn, 1, Rn) | ReceiveDataEvent
3 Aggregate()
Procedure Share(vn, Fn)
4 Pn ← ∅
5 for i← 1 to k do
6 Pn ← Pn ∪ {vn} ∪ {−vn}
7 end
8 Pn ← Pn ∪ {vn}
9 µn ←rand Pn
10 for i← 0 to 2k do
11 send(SHARE, µn[i],Fn[i])
12 end
Procedure ReceiveShareEvent(SHARE, p, r)
13 if (r ∈ Qn ∧ p ∈ {−1, 1}) then
14 cn ← cn + p
15 end
Procedure Broadcast(n, cn, ln, Rn)
16 foreach (r ∈ Rn) do
17 send(DATA, n, cn, ln, r)
18 end
Procedure ReceiveDataEvent(DATA, s, cs, ls) from
neighbor identity t
19 if (s = n or ls > δL(s, n)) then exit
20 if (cs /∈ Cn[s]) then
21 νs ← cs
22 Cn[s]← Cn[s] ∪ {cs}
23 Broadcast(s, νs, ls + 1, Rn r {t})
24 else
25 νs ← ⊥
26 end
27 Γn[s]← Γn[s] ∪ {(t, cs, νs, ls)}
Procedure Aggregate()
28 result ← 0
29 for s← 0 to N − 1 do
30 if (s 6= n) then
31 hn[s]← CheckInconsistency(s)
32 else
33 hn[s]← cn
34 end
35 result← result + hn[s]
36 end
Procedure CheckInconsistency(s)
37 if (|Cn[s]| = 1) then
38 return Cn[s][0]
39 else
40 return correct value after verifying Γ[s]
of neighbors
41 end
3 Protocol
In this section, we first present our polling protocol and give some properties of this protocol.
We assume there is no crash and message loss.
3.1 Description
Generally, the polling protocol includes three phases (see Algorithm 1): (i) Sharing, (ii) Broad-
casting and (iii) Aggregating. Phase Sharing describes the generation, distribution of a set of
shares of each node to its neighbors as well as collecting these shares from its neighbors. In
the Broadcasting phase, each node broadcasts messages containing the total shares, which are
collected in the Sharing phase, to its direct and indirect neighbors. The last phase, Aggregating,
shows the process that each node decides data received from other nodes and computes the final
outcome.
Sharing. In this phase, each node un contributes its opinion by sending a set of shares expressing
its vote vn ∈ {−1, 1} to its neighbors. We inspired the sharing scheme proposed in [5] to
generate shares. Namely, un generates 2k+ 1 shares Pn = {p1, p2, ..., p2k+1} where pi ∈ {−1, 1},
i = 1, 2, ..., 2k + 1 including: k + 1 shares of value vn, and k shares of opposite vn’s value.
Later it generates randomly a permutation of Pn, and sends these 2k + 1 messages to 2k + 1
Inria
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direct neighbors. Lines 4–12 in Algorithm 1 describe this phase. Node also receives exactly
2k + 1 messages from its direct neighbors. We can target this strict number of nodes in the
set of receivers and senders by the following approach: each node un will determine all possible
receiver sets Fn ⊆ Rn such that |Fn| = 2k+1 by choosing 2k+1 arbitrary elements from Rn, i.e.,
Fn = {mn1 ,mn2 , ...,mn2k+1}, ∀mni ∈ Rn. Node un also knows all other possible set Fp of any
other node up. From this it can identify all possible tuples ofN sets of the form (F0,F1, ...,FN−1).
For each tuple (F0,F1, ...,FN−1), it will check whether the following condition is satisfied: each
element mni ∈ Fn, 0 ≤ n < N must belong to exactly other 2k sets Fi1 , Fi2 , ..., Fi2k , n 6= ij , j =
1, 2, ..., 2k. If there exists a tuple (F0,F1, ...,FN−1) fulfilled above conditions, the requirement
about number of receivers and senders at each node will be satisfied. For instance, specially,
each node un defines the set of receivers Fn = {u(n+1) mod N , u(n+2) mod N , . . . , u(n+2k+1) mod N}
of size 2k + 1. Besides, wee see that Qn = {u(n−1) mod N , u(n−2) mod N , . . . , u(n−2k−1) mod N} of
size 2k + 1.
After all nodes collect 2k+ 1 shares from its neighbors, and sums into collected data cn (lines
13–15 in Algorithm 1), this phase is complete. Figures 2 illustrates an example of the protocol
for k = 1. Figure 2a presents desired vote of each node, whereas Figure 2b depicts the sharing
phase at node A. Node A would like to vote +1, thus, it generates a set of 2k + 1 = 3 shares
{+1,−1,+1} which total equals to vA = 1. Figure 2c shows node A collects the shares from its
neighbors and computes the collected data cA = 3.
1A
1E
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-1 B
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1 D
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1 K
N1 -1 1 -1
(a) Desired vote of each node
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(d) Broadcasting phase
Figure 2: Polling algorithm for k = 1
Broadcasting. In this phase, each node un encapsulates the collected data cn with its identity
n and length counter ln, which expresses the length of the path message has passed (initially,
ln = 1), into message msg and disseminates it to all neighbors (lines 2 and 16–18 in Algorithm
1). This action is depicted in Figure 2d. When un receives from ut message msg(s, cs, ls) emitted
from the source us, it performs the following actions (see ReceiveDataEvent() in Algorithm 1):
1. Loop detection: un checks contents of msg and detects the loop based on the source’s
identity (line 19 in Algorithm 1). If this message is the one un has emitted earlier, i.e.,
s = n, then un simply drops the message and does not need to inform ut. Otherwise, un
accepts msg.
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2. Message Forwarding : For a message passing the loop detection, un should get data cs and
forward to its friends except ut.
We see that, naively approaching, un can receive cs from many disjoint paths (without
loop) connecting between us and un. However, the number of paths can be blown up to
exponential value. More specifically, the worst case is when G is clique and one node has
N−1 friends. Each message passes through all nodes in the network, and thus, the number
of possible paths between us and un is (N − 1)(N − 2)...1 = (N − 1)!. This motivates us
to find out an optimal solution to bound the number of messages emitted from us that un
should receive without losing any necessary information.
Instead of using naive approach, we propose other technique which is small but very useful
and much more optimal: node receives messages which passed by paths with the limited
length rather than accepting all. Here, for messages broadcasting from us, we use bread-
first expansion with the assumption that transmitting message in one edge takes one time
unit. Hence, we see that firstly un receives messages from us in the shortest path pS(us, un),
and then from other paths of greater length. By the way, the content of messages can be
changed by some intermediate dishonest nodes in the path p ∈ Pa(us, un). Thus, we should
take care the intermediate nodes. For each intermediate node x, it receives message from
us in pS(us, x) first and from the longer path later. Node un also receives message, which
passed x, from the shortest path pS(x, un) first and then from other longer paths p(x, un).
Therefore, un receives messages, which are broadcast from us and passed x, from the paths
with length δ(us, x) + δ(x, un) first, and from other longer paths later. To take care of
all possible changes in contents, un should receive all messages which already passed all
intermediate nodes. And so, the maximum length of the paths passing message un should
receive is maxx{δ(us, x) + δ(x, un)}.4. In case that for all node x, pS(us, x) and pS(x, un)
have some common nodes (different from x), un should not receive messages from the paths
of length δ(us, x) + δ(x, un) since they have a loop inside. It should receive messages from
paths of length δ(us, un) instead. So, we combine all of these results, and define one value
which un (resp. us) could use to determine the maximum length of paths which deliver
messages from us (resp. un) to un (resp. us) as follows:
δL(us, un) =
{
maxx∈Usn{δ(us, x) + δ(x, un)} if us 6= un ∧ |Usn| > 0
δ(us, un) otherwise
(3)
where Usn =
{
x ∈ V |x 6= us, un and ∃p1 ∈ PaS(us, x), p2 ∈ PaS(x, un) s.t. p1∩p2 = {x}
}
.
For message with ls ∈
[
δ(us, un), δL(us, un)
]
, node un accepts and does the following
activities, otherwise it simply eliminates that message. Line 19 in Algorithm 1 shows this
verification.
The activities in the case ls ∈
[
δ(us, un), δL(us, un)
]
are as follows (lines 20–27 in Algorithm
1): un checks Cn[s], a set of possible values emitted from the source with identity s, to
determine whether cs is already presented in it. If cs is not stored in Cn[s], un will add
it into Cn[s], and then forward message msg(s, νs, ls + 1), where νs is value to be sent (in
this case νs = cs), to other direct neighbors except ut. All information about the messages
from source us is stored in the routing table Γn[s] which is used for checking inconsistency
later. This table contains the following fields: first field is neighbor identity from which
it received message (e.g., t), second one is the receiving value (e.g., cs), third one is the
value to be forwarded (e.g., νs), and last field is the length of the path passing message
4See Lemma 5 for the correctness of this consideration.
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from the source us (i.e., ls). In this case, un adds tuple (t, cs, νs, ls) into Γn[s]. In other
case that Cn[s] has value cs inside, un does not need replicating that value in Cn[s], as well
as forwarding it to other friends as it already did earlier. It just stores information in the
routing table, by setting the sent value as null, i.e., νs = ⊥ (null).
Figure 2d depicts the process when node E receives message emitted from A. When msg(A, 3, 1)
with length 1 arrives to E, it stores cA = 3 into set of possible collected data of source A, that is
CE [A]. It then forwards msg(A, 3, 2) with length 2 to B and C and adds a tuple (A, 3, 3, 1) into
routing table of source A, i.e., ΓE [A]. Notice that A also sends msg(A, 3, 1) to B with the same
length as the one to E, thus, B gets the same message and does the same actions like E. Node
E gets forwarded message with length 2 from B. Since that is the second message having the
same source and collected data, but higher length, E does not forward it. Node E just inserts
one more tuple (B, 3,⊥, 2) expressing the information received from B into routing table ΓE [A].
Once there is no broadcasting messages in the network, this phase is over. Since each node
just sends and receives a finite number of messages, and all messages eventually arrives, it is
guaranteed this phase terminates correctly.
Aggregating. In this phase, un has to decide the collected data of other nodes before calculating
the final result. To make decision for node us, it checks |Cn[s]| (lines 37–41 in Algorithm 1): if
|Cn[s]| = 1, the single element in Cn[s] is chosen as a correct collected data, otherwise there
exists an inconsistency and it should do the verification: requesting all routing tables Γ[s] of
neighbors and indirect neighbors to check information received and forwarded by them. If one
node is detected that it already sent different values of its data or its receiving information,
then an alarm is raised and that node is tagged in its profile. By doing this, un also gets the
correct collected data of source us.5 So, in any case, un achieves the correct copy of collected
data of source us. It then stores that value as one item hn[s] in the array hn, which contains
collected data of other nodes, and adds into result (lines 29–36 in Algorithm 1). After checking
and summing up all collected data of nodes (including its own collected data cn), un obtains the
final result (that is result = cn +
∑
i 6=n hn[i]).
For instance, we consider Figure 2d again. From formula (3), we see that δL(A,E) = δ(A,B) +
δ(B,E) = 2. After receiving message msg(A, 3, 2) from node B, and updating routing table,
node E makes final decision to choose value from source A. As the set CE [A] is singleton, it will
set h[A] = CE [A][0] = 3. This value will be used to compute final outcome of polling later.
3.2 Properties of protocol
In section 2.1, we already introduced the characteristics of the polling model. It implies that our
protocol should have some properties such that the system can run correctly with (or without)
the existence of dishonest nodes. Namely, each honest node outputs the correct polling result,
controls the impact from the dishonest nodes, and not disclose its private information, whereas
the dishonest coalition could not control the polling process or fool an entire network without
being detected. In this section, we clarify those desirable properties by stating what protocol
should achieve with (or without) the existence of dishonest nodes such as accuracy and privacy.
We say the sharing vector µv (or µn) of vote v ∈ {−1, 1} (of node n) is the subset of
multiset of shares generated from vote v (or node n), i.e., µv ∈ 2Pv (or µn ∈ 2Pn) where
Pv = Pn = {p1, p2, ..., p2k+1} and pi ∈ {−1, 1}. We use µv(D), or simply µ(D), to mention the
shares generated from vote v that coalition D receives. We present µv[x] and Pv[x] as the number
of value x in sharing vector µv and set Pv, respectively, i.e., µv[x] = |{t|t ∈ µv and t = x}|,
Pv[x] = |{t|t ∈ Pv and t = x}|.
5See Lemma 8 for the detail of this verification.
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We denote the sum of all elements in the sharing vector µ by g(µ), i.e., g(µ) =
∑
i xi where
xi ∈ µ. Moreover, to express that node u (or coalition D, resp.) reveals vote x, we use the
notation u  x (or D  x, resp.).
Privacy. The privacy property expresses the ability of the system to prevent the private infor-
mation from being leaked to the dishonest nodes. In other words, the coalition could not reveal
any information of particular honest node beyond what it can deduce from its own vote, the
output of computation and the shares of votes.
Definition 1 (Privacy). The protocol is said private if the dishonest nodes cannot learn anything
about the vote of honest node. More formally, for any honest node un with vote vn, there exists
a negligible function ξ(k) such that:
Pr[D  vn] ≤ ξ(k) (4)
Accuracy. We define the impact of dishonest nodes as the difference between the output and
the expected result. In our case, vote is either “+1” or “-1”, and thus, with the system of N
nodes, the maximum and minimum final results are N and −N respectively. This implies the
maximum difference amongst the final outputs is 2N . As defined in [7], accuracy is given by the
maximum impact with respect to the maximum difference of the final outputs:
Λ =
1
2N
· max
n∈H(G)
∆(resultn,
N−1∑
i=0
vi) (5)
where resultn is the output of the poll (see Algorithm 1). Here and throughout this work, we
denote by ∆(x, y) the difference between value x and y, i.e., ∆(x, y) = |x− y|.
Definition 2 (Accuracy). The protocol is said accurate if there exists a negligible function ξ(k)
such that Λ ≤ ξ(k).
4 Protocol and graph without dishonest nodes
In this section, we consider only graphs of family G1 and analyze the correctness (including
accuracy and termination) of our protocol when deployed with graphs of G1. Next we give spatial,
message and time complexities. Finally, we show properties of G1 are necessary and sufficient
condition to ensure the correctness of our protocol. Here we do not consider the privacy property
as there is no dishonest nodes in this case.
Lemma 1 (Accuracy). After following the polling protocol, each node gets the accurate expected
output.
Proof. We will prove that the output of the protocol at each node is result =
∑N−1
i=0 vi.
In the sharing phase, each node un sends a sharing vector µn = Pn = {pn1 , pn2 , ..., pn2k+1} to
its 2k+ 1 direct neighbors and g(µ) = (k+ 1). vn + k. (−vn) = vn. In addition, un receives a set
of shares {p′n1 , p′n2 , ..., p′n2k+1} from its 2k + 1 direct neighbors and gets the collected data with
value of cn =
∑2k+1
j=1 p
′
nj . With the assumption that there is no dishonest node and without crash
or message loss, each message from the source successfully reaches the destination, and thus the
set of all sending shares of all nodes will be exactly coincided with the set of all receiving shares
of all nodes, namely: ⋃
V
{pn1 , pn2 , ..., pn2k+1} =
⋃
V
{p′n1 , p′n2 , ..., p′n2k+1}
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In the broadcasting phase, each messages msg from each node is broadcast or forwarded,
and finally arrived to all direct and indirect neighbors. It infers that the array hn contains all
collected data of all nodes in the system and these values comes from all the receiving shares of
all the nodes. Consequently, the final computation gives us the value:
result =
∑
0≤i<N
i 6=n
hn[i] + cn =
N−1∑
i=0
ci =
N−1∑
i=0
2k+1∑
j=1
p′ij =
N−1∑
i=0
2k+1∑
j=1
pij =
N−1∑
i=0
vi
Lemma 2 (Termination). The polling protocol is guaranteed to terminate.
Proof. In the sharing phase, each node has to send and receive a finite number of of messages,
that is 2k + 1. In the broadcasting phase, each node un receives and forwards the finite number
of message from source us, because it just receives message passed through the path with length
in the interval
[
δ(us, un), δL(us, un)
]
, not all message departing from s. Moreover, as there is no
looping, no losing message, no crash, each phase terminates correctly. The algorithm has a finite
phase, it follows the protocol finally terminates.
Proposition 1 (Spatial complexity). The total space each node must hold is O(N.dn).
Proof. Each node un needs to maintain a list of dn direct neighbors to contact, a set Cn to
get a set possible collected data of other nodes, a routing table Γn, a set hn to store the final
choosing collected data which size is N − 1. As there is no dishonest node, node un just inserts
into Cn[s] one value emitted from source us through the shortest path between us and un, i.e.,
|Cn[s]| = 1, and thus |Cn| = N − 1. The worst case for the routing table Γn[s] is when all
shortest paths between us and un are passed by its friends. In other words, Γn[s] contains at
most dn rows. It infers that |Γn| ≤ (N − 1).dn. Therefore, the spatial complexity in this case is
O(dn) +O(N − 1) +O((N − 1).dn) = O(N.dn).
Proposition 2 (Message complexity). The number of messages in our protocol is O(N.dn + k).
Proof. In the sharing phase, node un sends 2k + 1 messages to its direct neighbors. In the
broadcasting phase, it sends dn messages containing collected data to all of its direct neighbors.
It also takes a role as an intermediate node by forwarding message to all of its neighbors except
the node it got that message. For each collected data emitted from source us, the number of
messages node un forwards is equal to the number of elements in the set Cn[s]. The cause is that,
after receiving the first message of value cs passed by the shortest path with length δ(us, un),
un stores cs into Cn[s], forwards message to (dn − 1) neighbors, and never does this action for
the message having the same value but higher length later. Thus the number of forwarded
messages is |Cn|.(dn − 1). In ideal situation, with the same explanation as one in the spatial
complexity, we have |Cn[s]| = 1, and |Cn| = N − 1. Accordingly, the total message complexity is
O(2k + 1) +O((N − 1).(dn − 1)) = O(N.dn + k).
Proposition 3 (Time complexity). Assuming the system is synchronous one in which time
generates in round. Then the protocol operates in O(k +N2) rounds.
Proof. The sharing phase operates in 2k+ 1 rounds. In the broadcasting phase, node un broad-
casts collected data to dn neighbors and this takes dn rounds. As there is no dishonest node
in this ideal case, a collected data has to be delivered to some node us through the path with
length δ(un, us). For each intermediate node ut of this path, it forwards to its dt − 1 friends. It
infers that the collected data cn requires max0≤s<N{δ(un, us).maxut∈pS(un,us){dt − 1}} rounds.
Therefore, the time complexity is O(k) + O(max0≤s<N{δ(un, us).maxut∈pS(un,us){dt − 1}}) =
O(k + (N − 1).(N − 2)) = O(k +N2).
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Theorem 1. The properties of G1 are the necessary and sufficient condition for the polling
protocol to be deployed correctly in the system without dishonest nodes.
Proof. The sufficient conditions (⇐), is proved in Lemma 1 and 2. We only examine the remaining
of the theorem, the necessary conditions (⇒). Consider a general graph G. We will show G ∈ G1.
In the sharing phase of the protocol, each node un sends (or receives) exactly 2k + 1 messages,
i.e., |Fn| = |Qn| = 2k + 1. It can send (or receive, resp.) messages to (or from, resp.) the
same or different neighbors. Thus, dn ≥ 2k + 1. Notice that if these two sets are disjoint, i.e.,
Fn∩Qn = ∅, then un has at least |Fn|+ |Qn| = 2(2k+ 1) neighbors. The set of the graphs with
condition dn ≥ 2k + 1 also includes the set of graphs with condition dn ≥ 2(2k + 1). Therefore,
to apply protocol correctly, G must have the property Pg1 , and we have, G ∈ G1.
5 Protocol and graph with dishonest nodes
In this section, we revisit the relation between protocol and graph, but approach it with the
presence of D dishonest nodes. We consider graphs of family G2 and analyze the correctness
(including privacy and accuracy) of our protocol when deployed with graphs of G2. Next we
give spatial, message and time complexities. Finally, we show properties of G2 are necessary
and sufficient condition to ensure the correctness of our protocol. Here we do not consider the
termination property as it is similar to Lemma 2.
Privacy. We present the privacy of the protocol in Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 3. In the first phase, a node’s vote is revealed by dishonest coalition with certainty if
and only if its k + 1 direct dishonest neighbors received the shares corresponding to its vote.
Proof. The proof of the direction (⇐) of lemma is trivial. We only need to show the reverse
direction (⇒). Assume the contrary, i.e., coalition D knows vote vn of one node n but it gets less
than k+1 shares of value vn. We dismiss the case that all 2k+1 direct neighbors of n are dishonest,
as otherwise, D always gets the vote vn (e.g., by computation g(µ) = (k + 1).vn − k.vn = vn).
From the viewpoint of D, the best case for them to reveal vote is when it gets 2k shares of n.
Notice that, D breaks out the vote if and only if the summing of all shares equals to a vote vn.
This infers the remaining share which D does not get has value of 0. This contradicts to the
value of vote.
Lemma 4 (Privacy preservation). The probability that dishonest coalition D reveals vote v of a
given honest node n is bounded by
∑2k
m=k+1
(
D
N
)m
.
(
1
2
)2k+1−m and the protocol is private.
Proof. Let X and Y be the events “size of µv(D)” and “all k+ 1 shares in the sharing vector are
identical”, respectively.
From Lemma 3, the coalition D reveals vote v when µv(D) contains k + 1 identical shares
(and their value equals to vn). Thus, the probability that D discloses v is equal to the one of
event that D gets k + 1 elements of v in which k + 1 ones are the same (we do not consider the
case that µ(D) gets 2k+ 1 shares of v). Formally, Pr[n ∈ H(G),D  v] = Pr({X ≥ k+ 1}.Y ) =∑2k
m=k+1 Pr({X = m}.Y ) =
∑2k
m=k+1 Pr(X = m).P r(Y/{X = m}).
It is easy to see that Pr(X = m) =
(
D
m
)
/
(
N
m
)
where k + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2k.
Moreover, Pr(Y/{X = m}) is the probability to get k + 1 identical shares in the set of size
m which belongs to the set of 2k + 1 elements containing k + 1 ones of value v and k ones of
value −v, that is, Pr(Y/{X = m}) = (k+1k+1)( km−(k+1))/(2k+1m ).
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Consequently, Pr(XY ) =
∑2k
m=k+1
[(
D
m
)
/
(
N
m
)]
.
[(
k+1
k+1
)(
k
m−(k+1)
)
/
(
2k+1
m
)]
=∑2k
m=k+1
D(D−1)...(D−m+1)
N(N−1)...(N−m+1) .
k(k−1)...(m−k)
(2k+1)2k...(m+1) <
∑2k
m=k+1
(
D
N
)m
.
(
1
2
)2k+1−m
Choose ξ(k) =
∑2k
m=k+1
(
D
N
)m
.
(
1
2
)2k+1−m. We can see that, if D  N , then ξ(k) is negligible
function for all value of k. If k is a large number, then ξ(k) is also negligible. From definition 1
our protocol is private.
Corollary 1. In the first phase, the maximum number of votes revealed by a coalition of D
dishonest nodes is 2D with D ≤ N/5.
Proof. In the sharing phase, each node receives exactly 2k+1 shares, and so, the dishonest nodes
collect D(2k + 1) shares.
From Lemma 3, we have D(2k + 1) = (k + 1)x + y, where x is the number of honest node
to be revealed and y is the size of the set of shares which does not contain any k + 1 identical
shares of any node.
Since y ≥ 0, we have D(2k + 1) ≥ x(k + 1). It implies x ≤ bD. 2k+1k+1 c ≤ 2D (since 2k+1k+1 < 2
for all k > 0).
To make sure that not all half the honest nodes are revealed, i.e., x < N/2, the condition
of coalition D has to be satisfied the following condition: D(2k + 1) < N−D2 .(k + 1), it means
D < N(k+1)5k+3 . Because
N
5 <
N(k+1)
5k+3 ≤ N4 for all k ≥ 1, to make sure the inequation D < N(k+1)5k+3
always occurs, we must have the condition D ≤ N/5.
So x < min{2D, N−D2 } = 2D with D ≤ N/5.
Accuracy. We present the accuracy based on the ability of the honest nodes to get correct
output and to control the impact from dishonest nodes. We first justify clearly the condition
for receiving broadcasting messages from neighbors of each node that we use in the broadcasting
phase.
As mentioned in Algorithm 1, despite the use of richer social graph structures, one node
can receive/send so many duplicated messages from/to other nodes. This leads to flooding the
local storage. We call this situation a naive approach. We propose a simple optimal technique
like this: each node n should receive broadcasting messages from the path with length ls ∈
[δ(s, n); δL(s, n)]. We use breadth-first expansion from s with the assumption that transmission
in one edge takes one time unit. This gives the fact that node n receives the broadcasting messages
from the shortest paths first, and later it receives messages from the paths which length are not
greater than δL(s, n). Moreover, for each message generated by s and passed from the path p
which length satisfies the condition δ(s, n) ≤ l(p) ≤ δL(s, n), n checks whether the collected data
cs exists in Cn[s] or not. If Cn[s] does not contain cs, n inserts cs into Cn[s] and then forwards
to other neighbors except the node it just received message. Otherwise, n does not put it into
Cn[s] or forward it. This way of creation gives us Cn[s] containing only distinct values.
To show the correctness of our optimal technique, we have to prove that all of (distinct)
information that n receives by using naive approach are stored in Cn[s] of the optimal approach
and vice versa. More formally, let us denote the set of all paths between s and n, the set of
possible collected data of the naive approach and of the optimal solution by Ns,n, V1 and Os,n,
V2, respectively. We also define the mapping fs,n : 2Pa(s,n) → Cn[s]. We have Ns,n 7→ V1 and
Os,n 7→ V2. We confirm the correctness of the optimal approach by showing that V1 = V2 in
Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. Prove that V1 = V2
Proof. Let csn(p) be the collected data receiving from path p = p(s, n).
We have V1 = {csn(p)|p ∈ Ns,n}, and V2 = {csn(p)|p ∈ Os,n}
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It is easy to see that V2 ⊆ V1 since Os,n ⊆ Ns,n.
We now prove that V1 ⊆ V2, i.e., ∀c ∈ V1 ⇒ c ∈ V2, by contradiction.
Indeed, assume the contrary, i.e., ∃ω ∈ Ns,n : c = csn(ω) ∈ V1 and c /∈ V2.
Since Os,n = {p ∈ Pa(s, n)|δ(s, n) ≤ l(p) ≤ δL(s, n) }, it infers that (i) l(p) < δ(s, n) or (ii)
l(p) > δL(s, n).
Case (i) cannot occur since δ(s, n) = l(pS(s, n)) ≤ l(p),∀p ∈ Pa(s, n). Thus, we only consider
case(ii). W.l.o.g., assume l(ω) = l0 + 1 where l0 = δL(s, n).
Figure 3: Path ω = 〈s ≡ w1, w2, ..., wi−1, x, wi, ..., wl0+1 ≡ n〉 of length δL(s, n) + 1
Let us consider a path p0(s, n) = 〈s ≡ w1, w2, ..., wl0 , wl0+1 ≡ n〉 (where wi 6= wj if i 6= j) of
length l0 and depicted in Figure 3.
Because n gets value c but not put it into V2, this value must be transferred by a cer-
tain node wi in path p0 and is also emitted from a certain node x which is not in path p0
but connects to wi. W.l.o.g., suppose x connects to wi−1 and the path ω is: ω = 〈s ≡
w1, w2, ..., wi−1, x, wi, ..., wl0+1 ≡ n〉. (We assume this for easily understanding the proof.
In general case that x does not connect to other nodes in p0 (except wi) but it is con-
tained in a certain path such as 〈s ≡ w′1, w′2, ..., w′i−1〉, we can consider the following path:
ω′ = 〈s ≡ w′1, w′2, ..., w′i−1, x, wi, wi+1, ..., wl0+1 ≡ n〉. We see that the role of ω and ω′ in the
proof are equivalent).
Firstly, we prove that x cannot connect to other nodes in p0, except wi and wi−1, i.e.,
e(x,wj) = 0, ∀j /∈ {i, i − 1}. Indeed, if ∃j: e(x,wj) = 1, i < j ≤ l0 + 1, then existing a
message from the path p′ = 〈s ≡ w1, w2, ..., wi−1, x, wj , wj+1, ..., wl0+1 ≡ n〉 of length l(p′) =
i − 1 + (l0 + 1 − (j − 1)) ≤ l0 contains value c. Moreover, as p′ ∈ Os,n, we have c ∈ V2.
Contradiction.
So, path 〈s, w2, ..., wi−1, x〉 ∈ PaS(s, x) and path 〈x,wi, wi+1, ..., wl0+1 ≡ n〉 ∈ PaS(x, u). We
have: l0 = δL(s, n) = maxy{δ(s, y)+δ(y, n)} ≥ δ(s, x)+δ(x, n) = i−1+(l0 +1−(i−1)) = l0 +1.
This inequation gives us the contradiction. Consequently, V1 ⊆ V2.
In conclusion, V1 = V2.
Corollary 2. If |V2| = 1 then the single element is correct collected data. Otherwise, there exists
an inconsistency.
Proof. As G is honest graph, then ∃p ∈ Pa(s, n): T (p) > 0, for all s, n ∈ H(G). By Lemma 5,
V2 contains at least one correct collected data, |V2| ≥ 1. Moreover, all values in V2 are distinct,
and there always exists one correct value, we get the conclusion of proof.
Consider the network with privacy conscious settings. In such network, each node has no knowl-
edge to calculate bounds for the path lengths between it and other nodes. In that case, in
actions 2 of the broadcasting phase, after receiving message from source s, node n could not
check the length of the path delivering that message, i.e., n does not check the condition
ls ∈
[
δ(s, n), δL(s, n)
]
. It just verifies the set Cn[s] and stores (and forwards, resp.) infor-
mation which has never been received (and forwarded, resp.) earlier. We call this approach
“privacy-conscious one”. Notice that, this approach is different from the naive one. In the naive
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approach, node n floods network by receiving/forwarding messages: it gets all messages, then
puts cs into Cn[s], and transfers it to other friends without checking whether that information is
already existed in Cn[s].
Corollary 3. By using privacy-conscious approach, no information from s to n is lost.
Proof. Let V3 be the set of possible collected data in the privacy-conscious approach. We first
prove that V3 = V2 = V1. Indeed, from the definition of V1 for naive approach above, it is easy
to see that V3 ⊂ V1. Moreover, in the privacy-conscious approach, node n receives all messages
without checking the length of the path delivering them, and thus V2 ⊂ V3. By Lemma 5,
V1 = V2, hence, we have V3 = V2 = V1.
Lemma 6 (Sharing). In the sharing phase, one dishonest node affects at most 2k+2 to the final
result.
Proof. We will prove that ∆(g(µn), vn) ≤ 2k + 2, where n ∈ D(G).
We have µn ⊂ Pn, |µn| ≤ 2k + 1. A dishonest node tries to impact the final result by either
(i) generating and sending less than 2k+1 shares, or (ii) sending less than k shares of “1” or more
than k+1 shares of “-1”. From the standpoint of dishonest coalition, the best case is when it votes
vn = +1 but sends all 2k + 1 shares of value “-1”, it means µn = Pn = {−1,−1, . . . ,−1}, |µn| =
2k + 1. The impact is ∆(g(µn), vn) ≤ |1− (−2k − 1)| = 2k + 2.
Lemma 7 (Computing collected data). The maximum impact of the dishonest node into the
collected data is 4k + 2.
Proof. We will prove ∆(cn, c′n) ≤ 4k + 2 where cn and c′n are respectively the correct collected
data and the sending value of node n ∈ D(G). Indeed, each node can only receive at most 2k+ 1
shares generating from its 2k + 1 direct neighbors. After receiving the set of shares, a dishonest
node can modify that data by inverting all shares of “1” to shares of “-1” in order to decrease it
as much as possible. It can also create a forged collected data. But in any case, the dishonest
node can only modify and create at most 2k + 1 shares, and cn ∈ [−2k − 1, 2k + 1]. The best
case, from the point of view of dishonest coalition, is when it gets cn = 2k+ 1 (i.e., 2k+ 1 shares
of “1” ), and forwards the different value c′n = −2k − 1 by converting all share “1” into “-1” .
Thus we have ∆(cn, c′n) ≤ |2k + 1− (−2k − 1)| = 4k + 2.
Corollary 4. There exists a public verification scheme detecting with certainty the attack that
a dishonest node modifies the collected data of other one by more than 4k + 2.
Proof. As cn ∈ [−2k − 1, 2k + 1], if a dishonest sends an incorrect value c′n /∈ [−2k − 1, 2k + 1]
then ∆(cn, c′n) > 4k + 2. The attack is identified and the dishonest node is exposed.
Lemma 8 (Broadcasting collected data). There exists a public verification scheme that detects
with certainty a dishonest node broadcasts (or forwards) inconsistent copies of its collected data
(or collected data of other nodes) and exposes that dishonest one.
Proof. Before proving this Lemma, we present all capabilities of dishonest nodes in the broad-
casting phase. Dishonest nodes can promote their votes by modifying the content of the broad-
cast/forwarded messages and try to convince that are correct. However, as motivated in Section
2.1, we do not take into account the Sybil attacks, spam, and wrongfully blaming since these
kinds of attacks are already detected by several practical systems. Therefore, without Sybil
attacks, in the broadcasting phase, dishonest nodes can change all contents of the broadcast-
ing message, except identity. It implies they cannot create any forged messages which contain
identity of other nodes. Moreover, in the wrongfully blaming, it may be one dishonest node or
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coalition try to accuse other honest node or set of other dishonest nodes. We can understand
about this kind of accuse by considering an example in Figure 4a. In this case, node n receives
two different values from source s, one directly from s (+3) and one from v (-3). If n requests
s the value it sent to other nodes, and s replies that s sent to v value +3 (same as the one sent
to n), in this case, s will indirectly wrongfully accuse v as dishonest node, because according to
information from s, v later forwards to n different value from the one it received from s, and
thus, v must be dishonest and tagged. Actually, in a system that honest nodes are majority, the
probability for one dishonest nodes to be exposed when wrongly accusing honest ones is high.
Like in the example, if v is wrongly accused only by a small number of nodes, the allegation
would be in doubt and not be considered, and the accuser s would be finally backfired. By the
way, we do not allow this kind of blame in the system, and assume that no node would like to
be tagged as dishonest which does not wrongly blame other nodes.
Using above assumptions and all possible capabilities of dishonest nodes, we can detect the
attacks in broadcasting/forwarding inconsistent copies of collected data by using the following
verification scheme: requesting and checking routing tables of neighbors. More particularly,
when honest node n detects inconsistency of the collected data from source s, i.e., Cn[s] =
{w1, w2, . . . , wl} where l > 1, wi 6= wj , i 6= j, for each wi ∈ Cn[s], n checks in the routing table
Γn[s] to finds out all neighbors {vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vij} that send wi to n. Then n sends Γn[s] as well
as requests to check the inconsistency of the value wi to its neighbors, neighbors of neighbors,
and so on. Notice that, as motivated above, we do not allow the dishonest nodes wrongfully
blame honest nodes. Hence, the dishonest nodes cannot spoof incorrect versions of routing
tables because that action has indirectly wrongfully blamed the honest nodes that the honest
nodes have broadcast/forward wrong value they have given. With that notice, and based on
the information from direct and indirect neighbors, there exists a honest node, direct or indirect
neighbor of n, who can detect the violation and expose the dishonest nodes with the following
cases. Here we present all of the dishonest nodes’ intention, and in each case we give the specific
way demonstrating in the concrete example in Figure 4, to expose correctly the dishonest one.
1. Broadcast inconsistent copies of its collected data to honest nodes.
1.1. The dishonest node forwards two different values to honest nodes which are directly
connected.
Figure 4a shows that s forwards different value to n and v. As v is neighbor of
n, it receives from v the different value emitted by s. At the time of detecting of
inconsistency, n cannot conclude which node (or its neighbor) is dishonest. n requests
s and v to broadcast their routing tables and it also broadcasts its own table. By
doing this, n can verify that s sent different copies of its data.
1.2. The dishonest node forwards two different values to honest nodes but they have some
common (indirect or direct) honest friends.
In Figure 4b, s sends two different copies to w and t. As G is a honest graph, there
exists a honest node n that receives two different value and detects the inconsistency
by reviewing the size of Cn[s]. n then requests its friends v and x to broadcast their
routing tables and they also request from theirs neighbors to broadcast their routing
tables, and so on. By doing this, w and t will receive the routing table of each other
and detect that s sent inconsistent copies to them.
2. Forward inconsistent copies of the receiving collected data to honest nodes.
2.1. The dishonest node forwards a different value from the one it received to honest node
which is directly connected to the source.
This scenario is demonstrated in Figure 4c. Node v gets from s value 3 but it forwards
value -3 to n. As n is a neighbor of s, it detects the inconsistency. Node v is exposed
when each node broadcast the routing table containing data it received to each other.
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2.2. The dishonest node forwards a different value it received from one honest node to other
honest node which have a honest path between them.
This more general case, comparing to case 2.1, is depicted in Figure 4d. After receiving
correct collected data from t, d forwards a forged one to n. From the honest path
〈s, t, w, v, n〉, n receives other value emitted from s. Because of inconsistency, n again
requests the broadcasting of routing table to its direct and indirect neighbors. When
checking its routing table, honest node t will detect the misbehavior of d: d forwarded
a different value from the one t sent to.
3. Not broadcast the collected data: This action can also be detected easily when honest node
checks and recognizes that it has not got any collected data of the certain source.
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Figure 4: Intention of the dishonest nodes.
Figure 4a and 4b depict the simple and complex case that dishonest node broadcasts inconsistent
copies of its collected data to honest nodes.
Figure 4c and 4d show the simple and complex case that dishonest node forwards different value
from the one it received to honest nodes.
Lemma 9. Every dishonest node may affect the expected final result up to 6k + 4 without being
detected by verification.
Proof. From Lemmas 6-8, we have the impact of the dishonest node n on the final outcome of
the protocol is ∆(resultn,
∑N−1
i=0 vi) = ∆(µn, vn) + ∆(cn, c
′
n) ≤ (2k + 2) + (4k + 2) = 6k + 4.
Thus, Λ = 6k+42N =
3k+2
N . Choose a function ξ(k) =
3k+2
N . When k  N , ξ(k) is negligible. By
Definition 2 we say that the protocol is accurate.
Corollary 5. Let α, in average, be the proportion of nodes voting “+1”. The maximum number
of dishonest nodes system can tolerate so that the final result is not affected is bN |2α−1|6k+4 c.
Proof. We have Pr[v = 1] = α, Pr[v = −1] = 1−α and the final output is αN.1−(1−α)N.(−1) =
(2α− 1)N . It can be inferred from Lemma 9 that the maximum impact from dishonest coalition
is (6k + 4)D. As mentioned in the polling model, we assume that the system wins with vote
“+1”, i.e., α > 0.5, and the dishonest coalition tries to do decrease the output as much as
possible. Thus, to make sure that the dishonest nodes do not affect to the final result, it implies
(6k+ 4)D ≤ (2α− 1)N or D ≤ b (2α−1)N6k+4 c. On other hand side, if the system wins with vote “-1”
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and dishonest coalition tries to increase the output as much as possible, we easily get the same
result D ≤ b (1−2α)N6k+4 c where α ≤ 0.5. Generally, we have the bound D ≤ b |2α−1|N6k+4 c.
Proposition 4 (Spatial complexity). The total space each node must hold is O(N.D.dn) if there
exists D dishonest nodes.
Proof. Each node un needs to maintain a list of dn direct neighbors to contact, a set Cn to get
possible collected data of other nodes, a routing table Γn, a set hn size of N −1 to store the final
choosing collected data. For Cn, in the worst case, for each honest source us, dishonest coalition
can forward to un at most D different values, and un also receives one correct value from the
honest path. Hence, the maximum size of Cn is (N−1).(D+1). Likewise, the worst case of Γn[s]
is when all shortest paths between source us and un are passed by its friends and all dishonest
nodes. Since there are dn neighbors and D honest nodes, we have the size of Γn[s] is at most
D.dn, and thus the maximum size of Γn is (N − 1).D.dn. Consequently, the total space each
node must hold in the worst case is O(dn)+O((N−1).(D+1))+O((N−1).D.dn) = O(N.D.dn).
Proposition 5 (Message complexity). The number of messages in our protocol is O(N.D.dn+k)
if there exists D dishonest nodes.
Proof. Node un sends 2k + 1 messages to its direct neighbors in the first phase, broadcasts dn
messages in the broadcasting phase to all of its direct neighbors, and hence, totally |Cn|.(dn− 1)
messages. The worst case for Cn is the same as the one considered in the spatial complexity part,
i.e., |Cn| = (N −1)(D+ 1), and thus, we have the total spatial complexity is O(2k+ 1) +O((N −
1).(D + 1).(dn − 1)) = O(N.D.dn + k).
Proposition 6 (Time complexity). Assuming the system is synchronous one in which time
generates in round. Then the protocol operates in O(k +N2) rounds.
Proof. The sharing phase operates in 2k + 1 rounds. In the broadcasting phase, node un sends
collected data cn to dn neighbors which takes it dn rounds. The collected data is delivered to some
node us through the path with length at most δL(un, us). For each intermediate node ut of this
path, it forwards to its dt− 1 friends. In the system, all nodes send message in parallel, and this
implies the collected data cn requires max0≤s,n<N{δL(un, us).maxut∈pS(un,us){dt − 1}} rounds.
Therefore, the time complexity is O(k + max0≤s,n<N{δL(un, us).maxut∈pS(un,us){dt − 1}} =
O(k + (N − 1).(N − 2)) = O(k +N2).
Theorem 2. The properties of G2 are the necessary and sufficient condition for the polling
protocol to be deployed correctly in the system containing dishonest node.
Proof. By Lemmas 3-9, we already showed the sufficient conditions, i.e., our protocol works
successfully with graphs of G2 and preserves its properties. We only need to clarify the remaining
proof of this Theorem. Assume we have a general graph G. We approach the proof by sketching
step by step the requirements G should obtain so that all properties of protocol are guaranteed.
In the sharing phase, node un sends (or receives) exactly 2k+ 1 messages, i.e., |Fn| = |Qn| =
2k+1. It can send (or receive, resp.) messages to (or from, resp.) the same or different neighbors.
Thus, dn ≥ 2k + 1. Notice that if these two sets are disjoint, i.e., Fn ∩ Qn = ∅, then un has at
least |Fn|+ |Qn| = 2(2k + 1) neighbors. The set of the graphs with condition dn ≥ 2k + 1 also
includes the set of graphs with condition dn ≥ 2(2k+ 1). Therefore, to apply protocol correctly,
G must have the property Pg1 .
In addition, in the broadcasting phase of protocol, it can be inferred from Lemma 2 that,
in order to make decision about the collected data of source s, node n has to check |Cn[s]|. If
|Cn[s]| > 1 then there exists an inconsistency, and n starts the verification process. In that
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procedure, it has to request its neighbors to send the routing table Γ[s], and its neighbors do
the same activities with others. The security in this situation is the protection of the table
transmission so that the the honest node has some witnesses to expose the dishonest ones.
As motivated in the introduction, we do not take into account the case that dishonest nodes
blame wrongfully other honest ones in the sense that they cannot modify the value that honest
nodes sent to or forwarded in the content of the Γ. Suppose G is not a honest graph, i.e.,
∃u, v ∈ H(G), T (p(u, v)) = 0. W.l.o.g, consider path p = 〈u ≡ uk1 , uk2 , . . . , ukm ≡ v〉 (where
e(uki , uki+1) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1), then T (p) =
∏m−1
i=1 q(uki , uki+1) = 0. It implies that ∀p(u, v),
∃ukj , ukj+1 : q(ukj , ukj+1) = 0, i.e., node ukj or ukj+1 is dishonest. And thus, the routing message
always passes throughout a dishonest node, the security property of protocol is not preserved.
Consequently, G must be a honest graph, or satisfies Pg2 .
Naively, assume D ≥ N/2, if all dishonest nodes behave properly towards the system by
voting a poll “-1”, not creating the set of shares to forward as well as not transmitting a forged
vote of other one, the final result is
∑
n vn < 0 since D ≥ N/2 regardless of other votes from
honest nodes. So we know the result before running protocol. Contradiction. Therefore, G has
property Pg3 .
In conclusion, G is the member of family of graph G2.
6 Experimental evaluation
We do some experiments to analyse the correctness of the protocol by observing the difference
between experiment output and the theoretical one. In the experiments, we use UDP and
asynchrony in message exchanging without crash or message loss. We implement protocol by
using an open-source Java library, YALPS6, to demonstrate the communication amongst node
and facilitate the development and testing of the applications. The application based on this
framework can be run both in simulation and real-world mode. As we do not consider crash and
message loss in the experiments, we performed them in the local machine by a simulating graph.
We plan later to examine protocol in the real-world network like PlanetLab, with the presence
of crash and message loss to fully evaluated.
We study the experiment with the existence of dishonest nodes, and examine whether the
real impact from the dishonest coalition to the outcome is inside the analytical bound or not.
Moreover, we consider the worst case for the system in the sense that the dishonest nodes try to
misbehave protocol by expressing the attack to decrease the final result at most without being
detected: each dishonest node always sends 2k+ 1 shares of value “-1” in the sharing phase, and
converts all receiving shares of “1” into ones of “-1”. Thus, each dishonest node affects the final
result at most 2k+ 2 in the sharing phase (if its desired vote is “1” and it sends 2k+ 1 shares of
“-1”) and 2(2k+1) = 4k+2 in the broadcasting phase (if 2k+1 receiving shares are “1” and all are
converted to “-1”). In other words, total impact will be up to 6k+4. If we denote by α number of
nodes voting “+1”, then the expected result will be αN−(1−α)N = (2α−1)N . So theoretically,
the biased final outcome should be inside the interval [(2α− 1)N − (6k + 4)D; (2α− 1)N ].
We examine the same experiment condition about number of nodes and dishonest nodes as
[9, 10]. Without loss of generality, we consider α value in the interval [0.5, 1.0] . Figure 5 depicts
our experiments for the network with N = 400, D = 19 in two subcases corresponding to two
different values of privacy parameter k = 1 (in Figure 5a) and k = 2 (in Figure 5b). In each test,
we compute the average output amongst all nodes and represented it as a point in the figures.
We see that the experimental result is certainly inside two bounds, expected theoretical bound
(thick-dashed line) and lower bound (dot-dashed line). The experiment result never touches the
6http://yalps.gforge.inria.fr/
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Figure 5: Experiment with N = 400, D = 19 to check the accuracy of protocol.
expected line as the dishonest node always sends 2k + 1 shares of “-1” and converts all receiving
shares of “1” to “-1” and this decreases the final output and makes it less than the expected
outcome. Moreover, the experiment result does not reach the theoretical lower bound either, i.e.,
the average impact is less than 6k+ 4. The reason we obtained this consequence comes from the
fact that the amount of average impact from dishonest nodes depends on the number of shares
“+1” it receives from neighbors. Namely, in the first phase, nodes voting “+1” will send k + 1
shares of “+1” and k shares of “-1”, and vice versa. Therefore, the probability one node receives
shares of “+1” from its neighbors is α. k+12k+1 + (1 − α). k2k+1 = k+α2k+1 , and the average number of
shares of “+1” is (2k + 1). k+α2k+1 = k + α. From the position of the dishonest nodes, they convert
all shares of “+1” into “-1” and thus, the impact will be 2(k + α). Combining to the fact that
they always distribute 2k + 1 shares of “-1” with the maximum impact is 2k + 2 (if its desired
vote is “+1”), we achieve the total impact 2k + 2 + 2(k + α) = 4k + 2α+ 2. In conclusion, with
D dishonest nodes, the average biased outcome is (2α− 1)N − (4k + 2α+ 2)D. In Figure 5, we
present this average value in a thin-dotted line. We try to fit our data points with a regression
line a(2α − 1) − b(4k + 2α + 2) and get these results (depicted as a solid line in Figure 5): for
k = 1: a = 385 and b = 17, and for k = 2: a = 373 and b = 16. These parameters are quite
accurate comparing to conditions of network with N = 400 and D = 19.
In Figure 5, we see that the impact from the dishonest nodes in case k = 2 is greater than in
case k = 1. This result is reasonable since we know that the higher value k is, the higher privacy
can be hold but the higher impact dishonest nodes can enforce, and hence, the worse the final
outcome is. Besides, all nodes output the correct result (or the final result greater than 0) for
k = 1 when α ≥ 0.67, and for k = 2 when α ≥ 0.75. It means the dishonest nodes confuse the
majority of nodes for k = 1 when α < 0.67, and for k = 2 when α < 0.75. Comparing to other
recent polling protocols like [9, 10], that value of α in our experiment is similar to them.
7 Related work
In this section, we discuss some recent research and motivate our contribution. Secret sharing
scheme in which a secret is divided into many shares and distributed to mutually suspicious
Inria
On the Polling Problem for Social Networks 23
nodes is first independently proposed by Blackley and Shamir. Till now, a lot of work related
to this topic has been published. We here describe a few of the most influential solutions which
does not depend on the heavy mathematical computations like cryptography.
DPol [9, 10]. This is a simple distributed polling protocol in a social network without using
cryptography where nodes are concerned about their reputation. It ensures privacy and accuracy
despite the presence of dishonest nodes by means of combination of secret sharing and verification
procedures. In DPol, no user has a particular role and this views as a peer-to-peer network,
and increase the scalability and robustness. This work suggested a model of adversaries to be
compelling for various non-critical private and secure distributed computation problems in social
settings and DPol thus introduces a new direction of research in distributed computing. By the
way, DPol also remains some shortcomings when applied in practice. Firstly, DPol relies on a
structured overlay, cluster-ring-based structure, which is on top and really apart from the social
graph. It does not keep the normal social graph and take into account any social links between
nodes in the sense that it uses the uniform assignment of nodes to group. This is not practical as
we have to target a special one using notion of group instead of reserving the normal structure
of the graph. Till now, we do not know the way to build such an overlay ring-structure from a
social graph in a decentralized way. Moreover, the number of nodes should be a perfect square
such that a graph GP with N nodes can be divided into
√
N groups of size
√
N . On the contrary,
we propose a protocol deployed in a more general structure. Our objective is to keep the natural
property of the graph in the sense that the node and social links of graph should be preserved,
and each individual can perform the voting process privately and secure by its self, not based
on the group division. We can show that the family of graph G2 (we do not mention G1 here as
we just take care the general case of graph which has dishonest and honest nodes) considering
in our work includes the particular graph GP applied in DPol, i.e., GP ⊆ G2, with the following
reasons:
1. In DPol, each node un maintains these sets of friends: a set Po of its officemates inside the
same group g, a fixed-size set Fn of proxies for sending messages, and a fixed-size set Qn
of clients for receiving messages where |Fn| = |Qn| = 2k + 1. Of course the degree of each
node is not less than 2k + 1. This requirement is satisfied property Pg1 of our graph G2.
2. DPol also gives the fact that the dishonest coalition can both perform and cover dishonest
actions as soon as the number of dishonest nodes in two consecutive groups is not less than√
N . Thus, it needs the requirement |gm ∩ D|+ |gm+1 ∩ D| <
√
N holds for all group gm.
If D <
√
N , this condition holds with certainty. If D ≥ N/2, the coalition compromises
the system with certainty. And if
√
N ≤ D < N/2, the probability to do that intention
is less than 1. In our case, we use the same condition D < N/2 to make sure that there
is a majority of honest nodes in the graph and protocol works properly. The condition
D ≤ N/5 is to guarantee the number of revealed votes is not greater than half of honest
nodes and this one includes the condition D <
√
N which DPol used, and thus, DPol
satisfies the property Pg3 .
3. The property Pg2 of our graph G2 is implicitly given inGP , i.e., ∀u, v ∈ H(GP ) : T (u, v) > 0.
Indeed, the condition D <
√
N gives the fact that the number of dishonest nodes is strictly
smaller than the size of a group. This ensures the existence of honest node in a group even
the worst case that all dishonest nodes are concentrated in one or two consecutive groups.
Suppose u ∈ H(gi), v ∈ H(gj). If i = j then T (u, v) = e(u, v) = 1 since gi is a clique. If
i 6= j, w.l.o.g., assume i < j, j = i + l. We depict one example in Figure 6. For any two
consecutive groups gm, gm+1, ∃v1 ∈ H(gm), v2 ∈ H(gm+1) such that e(v1, v2) = 1. This
result is inferred from the fact that |gm ∩ D| + |gm+1 ∩ D| <
√
N . Thus, ∀x ∈ H(gm),
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Figure 6: Existence of the honest paths between two arbitrary honest nodes
y ∈ H(gm+1), we have: (i) T (x, y) = q(x, y) = 1 if x = v1, y = v2; or (ii) T (x, y) =
q(x, v1).q(v1, y) = 1 if x 6= v1, y = v2; or (iii) T (x, y) = q(x, v1).q(v1, v2).q(v2, y) = 1
if x 6= v1, y 6= v2. It means T (x, y) = 1, for all x ∈ gm, y ∈ gm+1. Apply this for
a chain of two consecutive groups gi and gi+1, gi+1 and gi+2, . . . , gj−1 and gj , we have
T (u, v) = T (u,w1).T (w1, w2) . . . T (wl, u) = 1 where wt ∈ H(gi+t), 1 ≤ t ≤ l. Consequently,
GP is a honest graph.
Above we already convinced that GP ⊆ G2, i.e., our protocol can be used in the ring-based
structure GP . We now point out that there exists a graph G0 such that our protocol can be
utilized but DPol cannot. Formally, we prove that ∃G0 : G0 ∈ G2 ∧G0 /∈ GP , and from this we
conclude G2 ⊃ GP . In other words, our protocol can be deployed in the graph structure which
is more general than ring-based structure demonstrated in DPol. Namely, we see that, in GP ,
the set of neighbors for sending message Fn and the set of neighbors for receiving message Qn
of each node are separate. In our work, G2 does not have that condition in the sense that each
node can send and receive message on the same or different link. For instance, let us consider the
graph G0 satisfying properties Pg2 , Pg3 of G2 and two other conditions: 2k + 1 < N ≤ 2(2k + 1)
and the set of receivers Fn of node un is the output of the function:
f : A→ 2A
n 7→ {(n+ 1) mod N, (n+ 2) mod N, . . . , (n+ 2k + 1) mod N}
where A = {0, 1, 2 . . . , (N − 1)}. Figure 7 presents G0 with N = 6 and k = 1, and the arrow
expresses the direction of sending message. We will prove that G0 ∈ G2.
Clearly, |Fn| = |f(n)| = 2k + 1. In addition, we easily see that Qn = {(n − 1) mod N, (n −
2) mod N, . . . , (n − 2k − 1) mod N} and |Qn| = 2k + 1. This follows that dn ≥ 2k + 1 and so,
G0 also has property Pg1 . It infers G0 ∈ G2.
In addition, we will clarify that G0 /∈ GP by justifying that in G0 we have Fn ∩ Qn 6= ∅,
i.e., ∃i 6= n such that i ∈ f(n) and n ∈ f(i). Indeed, for 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, we have: f(n) =
{(n + 1) mod N, (n + 2) mod N, . . . , (n + 2k + 1) mod N}. For all 1 ≤ x ≤ 2k + 1 < N , then
(n+ x) mod N 6= n. It infers that ∀i ∈ f(n), i 6= n is always true.
We just show that existing one value i ∈ f(n) such that f(i) 3 n. Choose i = [n+N − (2k+
1)] mod N . From the assumption that 2k+ 1 < N ≤ 2(2k+ 1), then n+ 1 ≤ n+N − (2k+ 1) ≤
n+ (2k + 1), and thus i ∈ f(n). We have:
f(i) =
{
(i+ 1) mod N, (i+ 2) mod N, . . . , (i+ 2k + 1) mod N
}
=
{
[n+N − (2k + 1) + 1] mod N, [n+N − (2k + 1) + 2] mod N, . . . , (n+N) mod N}
=
{
[n+N − (2k + 1) + 1] mod N, [n+N − (2k + 1) + 2] mod N, . . . , n}
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So n ∈ f(i).
Besides, instead of showing exactly value of i, we can see that:⋃
i∈f(n)
f(i) =
{
(n+ 2) mod N, . . . , (n+ 2k + 2) mod N
}∪
∪ {(n+ 3) mod N, . . . , (n+ 2k + 3) mod N}∪
∪ . . . ∪ {(n+ 2k + 2) mod N, . . . , [(n+ 2k + 1) + (2k + 1)] mod N}
=
{
(n+ 2) mod N, (n+ 3) mod N, . . . , (n+N) mod N, . . . , [n+ 2(2k + 1)] mod N
}
=
{
(n+ 2) mod N, (n+ 3) mod N, . . . , n, . . . , [n+ 2(2k + 1)] mod N
}
From this statement, we are sure that there exists i ∈ f(n) such that n ∈ f(i), and thus, G0 /∈ GP
but G0 ∈ G2. This proof shows that DPol cannot be deployed in this kind of graph, but our
protocol can work.
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Figure 7: Direction of communication amongst nodes in our protocol
AG-S3 [7]. Giurgiu et al. defined the Scalable Secure Computing problem in a distributed
social network called S3 problem. Such computation problem is challenging as it relates to the
situation that nodes need to compute a function f : V → U of their inputs in a set of constant size,
in scalable, private and accurate way. Base on S3 problem, they presented a distributed protocol,
AG-S3, that computed a class of aggregation functions in a S3 manner. On one hand side, this
secret sharing scheme is suitable for polling protocol as its core has some strong characteristics
such as: S3 computation concerning a sequence of message exchanges and local computation
such that the honest nodes eventually get the expected final result; node is allowed to obfuscate
their inputs which preserves privacy; and node can do a verification process to potentially tags
the dishonest nodes’ profiles. On the other hand, AG-S3 uses a special overlay graph structure
like DPol where N nodes are distributed into groups of size
√
N . This is the same drawback as
DPol we already analyzed above.
Secret sharing homomorphisms [2]. This is one of the first works about secret sharing
scheme. It proposed a model which described a homomorphism property to allow multiple secrets
to be combined by direct computing on shares. The homomorphism property with respect to
addition allows this scheme to be applied as a fault-tolerance method of holding verifiable secret-
ballot elections. Nonetheless, it did not give the protection for the initial shares with the existence
of dishonest nodes, and so, the final result is likely impacted.
Verifialable secret sharing scheme (VSS) and Multi-party computation protocol
(MPC) [15] . VSS is an extension of [2]. This protocol works under the assumption that
a majority of the nodes are honest (i.e., it can tolerate up to D < N/2 dishonest nodes). The
secrecy achieved is unconditional and does not rely on any assumption about computational
intractability. Based on VSS, they also proposed a secure MPC protocol to privately compute
the user’s shares and get the output with the exponentially small probability of error. However,
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these techniques assume the existence of fully connected network, complete synchronous commu-
nications together with a broadcast channel, secure pairwise communication channels between
participants, and particularly, heavyweight computation in mathematics. Furthermore, in spite
of computing the output with negligible error comparing to the correct value, MPC does not give
any condition to the user’s input, so it allows dishonest node to shares an arbitrary data, even a
large number. This activities can affect the output in a potentially unbounded way. Additionally,
the scheme ensures the privacy of all nodes, including the dishonest ones. This prevents it from
being applied into polling problem. Other later researches based on MPC such as [4, 3] have
improved some aspects of this scheme. They focus on the scalability and usability properties.
which the most relevant goal is minimizing the growth of complexity with number of nodes. [4]
proposed the unconditionally secure protocol with the most relevant goal that is minimizing the
growth of complexity. It shows that part of the communication complexity depending on the
circuit size is linear in N (with D < N/3). Meanwhile [3] presents a general MPC protocol which
is simultaneously optimal, up to lower-order terms, with respect to both efficiency and resilience.
Although these studies guarantee the privacy for node, again, like [15], including the dishonest
ones, and thus, this makes it hardly suitable to be used in polling.
Anonymous Multi Party Computation (AMPC) [13]. Malkhi & Palov introduced AMPC
which provided users with electronic anonymity without using any conventional cryptography, or
any means of non-trivial maths. Yet this method requires the assumption about existing of secure
channels between any pair of honest users and under a suitable resilience threshold of dishonest
users D <
√
N . Moreover, although this technique increases privacy, the AMPC network is built
on top of normal social graph in the sense that it uses group notion to form some levels (rows):
users split their inputs into several shares and submit each share to one of the nodes in the first
(top) row; the top row nodes permute the input and split into several sub-shares and send each
sub-share to a node in the second level; each node in the second row combines the receiving
sub-shares, permutes them and continue sending the split shares to the nodes in the third level,
and so on; the last (bottom) row combines the shares to obtain the output. This structure is
not practical as mentioned above, and is different to our concern that we target to the normal
structure of graph, not overlay or transformation of the graph.
E-voting protocol [12, 1]. Based on AMPC [13] and an extension of Rabin and Ben-Or’s
check vectors [15], Malkhi et al. proposed a distributed e-voting protocol. Despite this protocol
is information-theoretically secure with strong property that system can withstand the corrup-
tion from almost half the number of nodes, each node in this protocol needs to maintain some
predefined roles such as receivers, voters, dealers, talliers, registrars. This may decrease the
scalability as a small set of nodes that are not part of the system (e.g., dealers) may get the
load of distributing initial shares to voters, and may also decrease the robustness if specific node
is failed. In addition, that protocol fully supports the requirement of democracy (guaranteeing
that each voter is able to vote), verifiability, and unconditional accuracy whereas polling protocol
needs to be simple by relaxing such constraints. Baudron et al. also proposed other distributed
e-election in [1] that guarantees privacy of node, provides public verification, and robustness.
However, it uses asymmetric cryptography.
Rating system. There are some similarities between reputation (rating) system and polling
system in which user evaluates the quality of one person by locally promoting his choices and
then collecting ideas from the remaining ones of the network. There are some works related to
this concern. [16] addressed the system requirements that a reputation system should have and
detailed some main attacks it can suffer. [11] designed mechanism for accurately grading and
fast retrieval. However, these studies concentrated in researching frading mechanism instead of
providing efficient polling schemes. Dutta et al. [6] discussed a distributed rating mechanism
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along with rating validation schemes aimed at tackling the free-riders problem and potential
collusion problem in P2P network. By the way, these approaches generally do not address to
privacy, as well as not provide a global polling since grading expect on only a subset of nodes
(not all nodes in the system). This makes it difficult to be applied in polling.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a design of a distributed polling protocol and defined a family of social
graphs. We proved the structures of our family of graphs constitute necessary and sufficient con-
dition to assure privacy and accuracy properties of the protocol with the presence of dishonest
nodes. To detect dishonest nodes’ misbehaviors, we presented verification procedures by using
routing table and shortest path scheme. Furthermore, a small but useful technique based on
shortest path scheme was introduced to prevent a node from receiving/sending so many dupli-
cated messages without losing any necessary information. Unlike other works, we considered a
protocol with a more general family of graphs, but obtained some similar results. More specifi-
cally, we achieved the same maximum number of votes that dishonest coalition can reveal, and
the same impact from the coalition to the final output. In the future work, we plan to design
an efficient polling protocol that can be deployed in the real-world network with the presence of
failure and message loss.
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